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Peterson: Minors' Right to Counsel

COMMENT

JUDICIAL DISCRETION IS INSUFFICIENT:
MINORS' DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO
PARTICIPATE WITH COUNSEL WHEN
DIVORCE CUSTODY DISPUTES INVOLVE
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In divorce proceedings, the parental custody decision must
reflect the best interests of the child. 1 Both the court and the
parents have an obligation to act in the child's interests. 2 Ideally, the parents cooperate and the child need not participate
in the action. 3 However, in contested custody proceedings,
1. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (1991). Various factors considered in
awarding custody include the child's preference, the stability of the home
environment likely to be offered by each parent, and any evidence of domestic
violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a
history of violence between the parents. See id.
2. See Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925), where Judge Cardozo
expressed the basis for custody decisions: "The Chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether
father or mother, has a cause of action against ... anyone. He acts as parens
patriae to do what is best for the interests of the child." Id. But see Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36
(1977) (acknowledging that "judges . . . may find it difficult, in utilizing vague
standards like 'the best interests of the child,' to avoid decisions resting on [their)
subjective values"); Emile R. Kruzick & David H. Zemans, In the Best Interests of
the Child: Mandatory Independent Representation, 69 DEN. U.L. REV. 605, 606
(1992) <concluding that the best interest test cannot be determined without independent representation for the child); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re·Expressing Parent·
hood, 98 YALE. L.J. 293, 303 (1988) (noting that the best interests of the child
standard reflects societal judgments rather than individualized fact-finding into the
child's relationships).
3. See In re William T., 218 Cal. Rptr. 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1985), where the

513

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 3

514

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:513

parental cooperation can deteriorate, and the court must struggle to determine the child's best interests. 4 Counsel for the
parents cannot represent both the child's best interests and the
interests of their clients when those interests are divergent. 6
Thus, the judge must perform the passive role of arbiter between the parents and, at the same time, protect the child's
interests under the doctrine of parens patriae. 6 To ensure that
the child's interests receive priority in the midst of other competing interests, courts have discretion to appoint an independent representative for the child. 7
Many commentators argue that the fundamental fairness
of due process requires appointment of counsel for the child in
all contested custody cases. 8 These commentators believe that

court noted that in most custody proceedings, the child depends upon others to
represent her best interests. The child is normally not a party to the action, which
is viewed as a civil action determining the right of parents. Id. A dependency pro·
ceeding adds the interest ·of the state, as the guardian for the child. Id.
4. See JUDGE BERNARD BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952) (commenting' that
"[a) judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody
issue than about any other type of decision he renders"); see also Flores v. Flores,
598 P.2d 893, 896 (Alaska 1979) (finding that "the crucial determination of what
will be best for the child can be an exceedingly difficult one as it requires a delicate process of balancing many complex and competing considerations that are
unique to every case"); Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Deci·
sion-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 722·23 (1982·83) (cit·
ing judges' statements that the importance and the unavailability of facts makes
custody determinations troublesome); Robert H. Mnookin, Child·Custody Adjudica·
tion: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
226, 229 (1975) (stating that "the determination of what is 'best' ... for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative").
5. Maurice K. C. Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce
Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 917, 924 (1976) (emphasizing that the
parent's attorney has a duty to his client to minimize the effect of evidence of
parental unfitness, even when this conflicts with the best interests of the child).
6. Id. at 921. "Parens Patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a
legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.
1971).
7. See Judge Robert W. Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody
Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181, 183 (1964) (relying on
the "inherent power of the court to implement . . . concern for the welfare of the
child" through the power of appointment).
8. See, e.g., Howard Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented
in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255 (1991); James K. Genden, Separate
Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in
Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 564 (1976); Judge Robert W.
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the circumstances surrounding contested custody disputes lead
to inadequate proceedings when a single voice does not speak
solely for the child. 9 This rationale is even stronger when allegations of child abuse are present. 10
This comment will illustrate how allegations of child
abuse ll in a divorce custody dispute 12 dramatically alter the
presumption that the child's interests are well represented.
Therefore, appointment of counsel for the child becomes necessary. The author first summarizes current state laws which
address this issue 13 and discusses the factors which cause
discretionary appointment to fail. 14 Next, the author demonstrates the trend of appellate court decisions and state laws
toward mandatory appointment of counsel when abuse is alleged. 15 The author then argues that mandatory appointment

Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the
Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181 (1964) (discussing the appointment of an attorney guardian by Wisconsin judicial decree in every case with disputed custody or
concern for the child's welfare); Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte A. Perretta, A
Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108 (1971); Paul K
Milmed, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177 (1974); Ralph J. Podell, The "Why" Behind
Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L.
REv. 103 (1973); Maurice K. C. Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in
Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 917 (1976).
9. See In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 86 (Mont. 1985), where the court
observed that the child custody dispute presents a "unique situation because the
child, although not a party to the action, is the person most affected by the action." The child lacks maturity to either determine or represent her own best
interests. Id.
10. See Kerin S. Bischoff, The Voice of the Child: Independent Legal Representation of Children in Private Custody Disputes When Sexual Abuse is Alleged, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (1990).
11. Child abuse is typically defined by statute as "inflicting or causing physical
or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental health or
welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof
by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing
the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by law . . . ." WYO.
STAT. § 14-3-202(ii) (1994).
12. Most allegations of abuse in custody disputes involve sexual abuse and
about half of the sexual abuse allegations involve the child's father. Nancy
Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations Project, SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 20,
21 (1988).
13. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 23-77 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
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is necessitated by due process balancing of the child's and the
government's interest. 16 Finally, the author highlights a custody proceeding's similarity to dependency and termination
proceedings where representation is guaranteed. 17
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE
ALLEGATIONS

Presently, only one state requires appointment of a representative for the child in all disputed custody cases. IS Four
states have determined that allegations of child abuse or neglect always require appointment of a child's representative. 19
Most other states permit the appointment of a guardian ad
litem 20 or counsel for the child at the discretion of the
court. 21 Nevertheless, for various reasons, judges rarely decide

16. See infra notes 101·50 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
18. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for appointment of
a guardian ad litem in all contested custody cases and when "the court has special
concern as to the welfare of the child"). The guardian functions in the same manner as a party to the action. ld.; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(1I)(b)
(Supp. 1994), which was modified from mandatory to discretionary appointment.
19. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.423 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (requiring appointment of a
"guardian ad litem in any proceeding in which abuse or neglect is alleged"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 415.508 (West 1993) (requiring appointment at the earliest possible
time in any child abuse or neglect proceeding); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.165(2)
(West 1990) (requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem in all custody or visitation proceedings "if the court has reason to believe that the minor child is a victim of domestic violence or neglect"). Connecticut requires appointment by judicial
precedent. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
20. This Comment does not discuss the differences between counsel and the
position of guardian ad litem, which has many variations in different states from
an attorney having the full rights of counsel to a lay person, filing a report but
having no investigative duties.
21. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150(a) (West 1994) (providing for appointment
of private counsel upon court finding that appointment would be in child's best
interests); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-54 (1986) (allowing for appointment of counsel);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-918(b) (1989) (providing for appointment of an attorney);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(8) (Supp. 1992) (providing for appointment of guardian
ad litem); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 56A (West 1989) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for investigative purposes); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.12 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing for appointment of an attorney to represent
the interests of the child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.110 (West Supp. 1995)
(allowing for appointment of attorney if in the child's best interests). The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act permits the appointment of an attorney in private custody disputes to act as an advocate on behalf of the child. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 310, 9A U.L.A. 443 (1987).
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appointment is necessary.22

III. WHY JUDICIAL DISCRETION IS INADEQUATE WHEN
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE EXIST

When appointment of counsel is discretionary, in each
custody proceeding the court must make a determination of the
adequacy of the child's representation. 23 This case-by-case assessment of due process can degenerate into a standard finding
of adequacy based upon the court's preconceived notions.24
Instead of developing pretrial procedures and standards to
determine the need for counsel, judges are likely to be predisposed towards a single determination. 25 Because judges rarely
have before them all of the facts concerning abuse, decisions
are often fashioned to serve the interests of parents or the

22. Linda D. Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is
Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 56 (1992). Various reasons for the refusal to appoint include: judicial attempts to streamline procedures, added court costs for the parents, lack of competence of available guardians ad litem, and a belief that the
child's interests are already adequately protected. [d. Because appointment is discretionary, the judge's decision is rarely overturned. [d. See infra notes 23-77 and
accompanying text for a discussion regarding the inadequacy of judicial discretion.
23. See Mistretta v. Mistretta, 566 So. 2d 836, 837-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990). In Mistretta, the court found that the wife's interest in obtaining child support coincided with the best interests of the child and, thus, the child's representation was adequate. [d. at 838. The court noted that Florida law requires no appointment of a guardian ad litem if "the interest of the minor will be fully protected throughout an action." [d. at 837 (citing FLA. RULES OF CIV. P., Rule
1.210(b». The court noted further that the child has due process rights when the
interests of the child may be adverse to the interests of the parent. [d. at 837-38
(citing Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980». The Court of
Appeals in Johns remanded for appointment of counsel for the child where the
parties could not adequately represent the infant in a hearing to deport the infant
to her natural mother. Johns, 624 F.2d at 524.
A right to counsel also guarantees the child's right to counsel of choice.
Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975) (allowing a minor's retained counsel of choice over parents' objection in a dependency matter); Akkiko
M. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1985) (obligating the court to
honor minor's counsel of choice in a dependency hearing if the minor is competent
to choose an attorney and chooses competent counsel).
24. JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD, 54 (1973) !hereinafter GoLDSTEIN, ET AL.J (contending
that the "best interest test" is a misnomer).
25. Id.
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general policies of administrative agencies. 26
A. THE FAILURE TO FuLLY INQUIRE INTO FACTS OF ABUSE
One reason why judges may not have enough information
to adequately exercise their discretion is that often the parents
themselves discourage investigation of abuse. 27 Normally,
when accused of child abuse, one parent seeks to discredit any
allegations of abuse while at the same time requesting some
custody or visitation arrangement. 28 The other parent may
have reasons not to fully explore the facts of alleged abuse as
well. For example, the other parent may be involved in the
abuse or subject to spousal abuse. 29 Often, one parent may
fabricate charges of abuse to prolong or modify the custody
decision30 despite the imposition of penalties for false allegations. 31
In addition to the parents, the court itself may proceed in
a manner which discourages exploration of the allegations of
abuse. Although the court has a duty to gather evidence in the
absence of a diligent effort by parents,32 the family court often
26. [d. See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text for an explanation of why
the interests of parents and the state often overshadow the interests of the child.
27. See Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444, 448 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (recognizing
that parental motives in custody agreements can reflect "coercion, blackmail, consideration of property or other personal reasons not necessarily related to the best
interest of the child"); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1501, 1600 (1993) [hereinafter Developments) (noting that
a mother who protects her child may hurt her chances of obtaining custody); see
also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1973) (suggesting
that the court should not consider "conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child").
28. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021(h) (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting
the award of joint custody "if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern
of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed
against the other parent, a spouse, or any child").
29. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the frequent occurrence of child abuse with spousal abuse.
30. Campbell v. Campbell, 604 A.2d 33, 35 n.2 (Me. 1992) (citing the trial
court, which stated that a standard strategy in contested custody is to file an ex
parte order for protection from abuse to gain temporary custody and delay); see
generally DAVID HOROWITZ, FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, SEXUAL
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN DIVORCE CASES 51, 53 (1988).
31. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3027(a) (West 1994) (providing a monetary
sanction for a knowing false allegation of child abuse during a custody proceeding).
32. See, e.g., Sharp v. Sharp, 710 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. App. 1986), where the
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minimizes the allegations as exaggerations of spousal combat
or relies solely on the determination of abuse by the juvenile
authority, which applies a stricter standard of proo£l3 than is
applicable to custody determinations in family court.34 Without a fully developed record, the family court may be forced to
ignore important signs of abuse. 35 Moreover, when allegations
of abuse are not fully examined or explored, the appellate court
lacks sufficient justification to question the reasonableness of
the trial court's decision. 36
In Esdale v. Esdale,37 the family court granted custody to
a father despite testimony from county child protection workers, a psychologist, and the guardian ad litem that the father
had abused the child. 38 Evidence that no child abuse had occurred included a psychiatrist's opinion that the father was not
a child abuser and testimony that the mother fabricated the
charges. 39 On appeal, although the court found the evidence
supporting the father's sexual abuse "most troubling,,,40 the
court nevertheless held that the record was insufficient to

lower court approved custody to the mother while refusing to allow the court-appointed psychologist to interview her live-in companion, who was accused of abusing the child. Id. The appellate court affirmed the decision, but the dissent emphasized that the trial court has a duty to inquire into all matters that affect the
interests of the child even when the parties show a lack of diligence in gathering
evidence of abuse. Id.
33. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence as the minimal due process standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights).
34. See Mallory v. Mallory, 539 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1988), where the family
court allowed only supervised visitation by the father on a fair preponderance of
the evidence of child abuse instead of the clear and convincing criminal standard
required to terminate parental rights.
35. See OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(3) (1990) (requiring the court to ignore a
parent's "conduct, marital status, income, social environment," or similar factors
unless they are shown to cause damage to the child).
36. Changing the lower court's decision requires a finding of abuse of discretion or that the award is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Siegel, 463 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ill. App. 1984) (finding the presumption favoring the trial court is "strong and compelling"); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436
N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1982) (reversing the appellate court's modification of the
trial court's custody determination). "Appellate courts should be reluctant to substitute their own evaluation of [the child's best interests)." Id.
37. 487 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. App. 1986).
38. Id. at 1220 (Glickstein, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1219.
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demonstrate that granting custody to the father was unreasonable. 41
Even when the lower court restricts custody, the appellate
court may find an abuse of discretion and place the child in the
custody of a potentially abusing parent. In Gould v. Gould,42
an Arkansas appellate court modified a trial court decision
allowing only supervised visitation by the father who had been
accused of abusing his daughters. 4s The court of appeal discounted the testimony of a pediatrician confirming evidence of
sexual abuse. 44 Finding the evidence insufficient, the appellate court modified the trial court's decision by allowing unsupervised visitation with the father during summer vacation so
that he could "form normal parental bonds with his children."45
Cases such as these illustrate that the child's welfare may
be preempted where the lower court has not fully explored
evidence of abuse and no one has spoken for the child. If child
abuse indeed exists, decisions regarding custody and visitation
which are based upon inadequate information may subject the
child to continued physical and psychological harm.

41. [d. The concurring judge noted that he changed his opinion from a dissent
due to the ruling in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (preventing appellate judges from overruling the reasonable opinion of a trial court).
Esdale, 487 So. 2d at 1220.
42. No. CA 90-365, 1992 Ark. App. LEXIS 255 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1992)
(denial of petition for rehearing) (en bane).
43. Id. at *9 (en bane) (Mayfield, J., concurring) (stating that the trial court's
decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence). See id. at *13-27
(Cooper, J., dissenting), for a reproduction of the original three judge panel court
of appeal opinion.
44. Id. at *8 (Mayfield, J., concurring). However, the trial judge believed that
the pediatrician's findings, concerning the physical evidence of sexual abuse of the
three daughters, were "true and correct" and "had not been rebutted." [d. at *7.
45. Id. at *4 (Mayfield, J., concurring). The dissent from the denial of petition
for rehearing questioned whether the appellate court could, with certainty, reverse
the trial court based upon an appellate determination that a key witness was not
credible. Id. at *28.
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SIMULTANEOUS SPOUSAL ABUSE COMPLICATES MATTERS BY
FURTHER SUPPRESSING RELEVANT EVIDENCE

Custody proceedings face added difficulties when allegations of child abuse arise in situations also involving domestic
violence against a spouse. 46 The presence of spousal abuse
greatly increases the probability that the child is also
abused. 47 Nevertheless, many factors lead to an incomplete
inquiry into the family situation and the relationship between
spousal abuse and child abuse. For example, a parent is unlikely to fully report facts concerning abuse if that parent is
not only subject to abuse, but also participating in the child
abuse. 48 Furthermore, a battered spouse may choose not to
report child abuse out of fear of retaliatory beatings by the
other spouse. 49 If the battered spouse does report the abuse or
leaves, that spouse risks losing the child,50 for he or she will

46. Domestic violence refers to violence against a spouse. See In re Williams,
432 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ill. App. 1982) (observing that domestic violence can be a
"beacon" of potential harm to the child); In re Wiley, 556 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ill.
App. 1990) (holding that even when there was no evidence of child abuse, the trial
court properly concluded that allegations of spousal abuse could be a decisive factor in the custody decision); see also Meisner v. Meisner, 490 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985), where the trial court ignored allegations of physical and
mental abuse toward the mother, the children, and third persons during a hearing
on visitation. The appellate court deemed evidence of this violence relevant to the
disposition of the case and remanded the matter for a new hearing. Id.
47. LEE H. BOWKER, MICHELLE ARBlTELL & J. RICHARD MCFERRON, ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIFE BEATING AND CHILD ABUSE, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON WIFE ABUSE 158, 162 (1988) (finding, in a study involving 1000 battered women, that child abuse was present in seventy percent of the families where spousal
abuse occurred); Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis,
Commentary and Recommendations, Juv & FAM. CT. J. 1992lVol. 43, No.4, 33
(finding that daughters are six times more likely to be sexually abused when wife
abuse occurs).
48. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 60 (1984).
Walker found that women were eight times more likely to abuse children when
they themselves were being battered than when they were not in abusive relationships. Id. She also found that 53% of men who abused their mates also abused
their children, while 28% of the women who were abused did so. Id. at 59.
49. See M. Kara, Domestic Violence and Custody - "To Ensure Domestic Tran·
quility," 14 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 623, 634 (1984) (noting that abused spouses
tend to be fearful and are often exposed to danger when they resort to the
courts). See generally Linda R. Keenan, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation:
The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 422 (1985).
50. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 113 (1987) (findi~g that if
a battered woman leaves before the abuse gets serious, the court may decide that
she is unstable for abandoning her child); Ilona M. Bessenyey, Visitation in the
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have difficulty explaining how a person could tolerate the
abuse but still be an effective parent. 51
Although a majority of states require courts to consider
the existence of domestic violence in determining custody and
visitation,52 these allegations often are not fully investigated.
Both social workers and the judicial system tend to dismiss
charges of spousal abuse which arise during divorce proceedi ngs 53 or consider supporting evidence of spousal abuse irrelevant to child custody decisions. 54 When social workers and

Domestic Violence Context: Problems and Recommendations, 14 VT. L. REV. 57, 68
(1989) (concluding that lack of cooperation regarding visitation in abusive situations places the woman at risk of losing her child); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1,
46-47 (1991) (describing a situation where "a woman who had obtained a restraining order against her husband land] awoke one night to find him wielding a knife
in her bedroom; after she fled into the night, he claimed she had abandoned the
children, and she was unable to regain custody").
51. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1601-02 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 556-57 (1992) and noting that a
mother must demonstrate that she is an effective parent to receive custody, but
remaining in an abusive situation conveys helplessness); see also Hill v. Hill, No.
86-0399, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 4, 1987), where a judge granted custody to the
mother, changing the original award to the father, after the mother testified that
she had initially agreed to give custody to the father because he had beaten her
and the children. The court ordered the modification because the evidence of abuse
was not before the judge at the time of the initial custody award. Id.
52. Developments, supra note 27, at 1603 (finding that most states recently
have mandated domestic violence as a factor or as a presumption against custody);
see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090(8) (1991) (requiring courts to consider "any
evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the parents").
53. See FIELDS, Spouse Abuse as a Factor in Custody and Visitation Decisions,
in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 147, 162 (1986) (noting that "the issue of the
harmful effect on children from witnessing parental violence has had little impact
on our legal system"); see also Charlotte Germane, Margaret Johnson & Nancy
Lemon, Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The
Danger for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 192-93
(1985) (stating that "[j]udges and mediators also may make it clear to a battered
woman that the batterer's violence towards her is irrelevant in determining custody and visitation").
54. See In re Benjamin D., 278 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 n.5 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing
a California study which found judges often do not consider spousal abuse relevant
in custody decisions). The lower court had limited the introduction of evidence of
spousal abuse in spite of universal agreement of its detriment to children. Id. The
appellate court, however, observed that CAL. CIY. CODE § 4608, as amended in
1990, requires consideration of spousal abuse. Id.; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Civil
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody
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courts do investigate the combination of spousal and child
abuse, they may even decide that the battered spouse is an
unfit parent for failing to protect the child. 55 Legislation in
most states classifies a parent's failure to protect the child
from abuse as child neglect and imposes possible criminal
penalties. 56
Because the occurrence of spousal abuse with child abuse
increases the likelihood that evidence of child abuse will not be
fully explored by either the government or the parents, the
child has a strong interest in independent representation.
Providing the child with independent representation encourages the development of a true picture of the family situation and
assists in confirming or denying all of the allegations.
C.

OTHER INTERESTS
INTERESTS

1.

State Interests

OFTEN

OVERSHADOW THE

CHILD'S

State statutes, under the doctrine of parens patriae, reflect
the policy of preserving the natural family.57 Thus, joint cusDecisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1991) (concluding that the law punishes
battered women in custody decisions because the mother is required to prove that
domestic violence directly impacts the child in order to be relevant as evidence).
55. See In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 328 (W. Va. 1988), where the trial
court terminated the mother's parental rights because she failed to protect children
from her husband's abuse. The appellate court reversed termination of the
mother's parental rights, finding that the mother had tried to stop the abuse and
that she should be given time to overcome the effects of battered woman's syndrome on her parenting. Id. at 332-33.; see also WALKER, supra note 48 (observing
that, although mothers often cannot control the violence against themselves or
their families, child abuse workers frequently blame mothers for failing to protect
the child).
56. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 520, 553
(1992). Schneider points out that thirty-five states include the concept of omission
of protection in their statutory definition of "child abuse" and eight states
criminalize the failure to protect. Id.
57. State public policy often emphasizes "frequent and continuing contact with
both parents" after divorce. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994); In
Interest of Betty J. W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 329 (W. Va. 1988) (stating that child welfare statutes reflect this parens patriae bias towards maintaining family bonds);
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 835, 854 (1985) (concluding that "a great deal of behavior that would be
criminal or tortious between strangers may still be done with impunity within a
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tody statutes usually presume that the best interests of the
child require maintaining contact with both parents. 5S This
presumption may even disfavor granting custody to a parent
who believes abuse has occurred and opposes shared custody.59 Visitation policies also presume that the child benefits
from contact with the non-custodial parent. 60 Furthermore,
the government may express a policy interest of minimal interference with family relations and thereby exercise deference to
the family at the expense of preventing abuse. 61 These state
policies foster continued contact with each parent even where
one parent may be abusing the child. 62
An additional state interest that may overshadow the

family").
58. Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody:
Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GoLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 538, 554 (1982) (arguing that these "friendly parent" provisions
in joint custody statutes discourage opposition to joint custody); see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that "parental responsibility for
a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child"). But see CAL. FAM. CODE §
3040(b) (West 1994) (establishing no preference for or against joint or sole custody); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994) (creating a presumption, affecting the
burden of proof, that joint custody is in the child's best interests only if the parents agree to joint custody).
59. See In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Iowa 1983) (observing
that "[w]hen one parent's obduracy makes joint custody unworkable, the trial court
in a modification proceeding may find the child's best interests require sole custody in the other parent"); ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (1991) (requiring consideration of which parent will encourage frequent contact with the other parent).
60. A parent is entitled to visitation unless the court finds that "visitation
would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health."
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 407. For example, in Beckham v. O'Brien,
the appellate court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed
visitation rights while criminal charges of abuse against the father were pending.
336 S.E.2d 375, 377 (Ga. App. 1985). The court also found that the mother was
justified in refusing to obey the visitation order. Id. at 378.
61. See Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive
Due Process: Deshaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv. 659, 713-14 (1990) (explaining
that increased state and federal interest in domestic violence during the late 1970s
led to a conservative backlash to protect the family from government intervention).
The Family Protection Act, seeking to eliminate federal funds for child abuse prevention, was introduced, and in 1981, President Reagan closed the Office of Domestic Violence. Id.
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(A)(6) (Supp. 1994) (stating that a
relevant factor in the custody determination includes "[w]hich parent is more likely
to allow the child frequent and meaningful continuing contact with the other parent").
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child's interest is the conservation of fiscal resources. 63 Under
discretionary appointment, the family court must consider that
the state bears the cost if both parents cannot pay for the
child's appointed counsel. 64 When neither parent can pay, the
parents' own representation may be inadequate to fully examine allegations of abuse. 65 Thus, the state's interest in
conserving fiscal resources may lead a court to deny appointment of representation in precisely the situations where it
is most needed.
The state also has an interest in maintaining the integrity
and reputation of its social service agencies as an adequate
protector of the child. When child abuse allegations are investigated, the social worker often acts as the guardian ad litem
for the child and is presumed to represent the child's interests. 66 The social worker prepares a family social study and is
deemed a "disinterested party" whose reports are reliable. 67
However, state legislation requiring prompt reporting and
investigation of child abuse, scarce resources, and the attendant problems of proof all combine to discourage the full civil
and criminal investigation of abuse cases. 58 If the social work-

63. See State ex rei. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d
753, 757 (Or. App. 1974) (finding that the state may overlook the child's interest
to avoid expensive foster care).
64. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3153 (West 1994) (allowing the court to appor·
tion any costs of the child's counsel that parents are unable to pay to the county).
65. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile
Courts in Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 217 & n.103 (1987).
Judge Edwards observes that one or both parents may be without an attorney,
because government legal services is often unable to represent indigents in custody
proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances. Id. The lack of counsel for
the parents will limit examination of crucial issues relating to abuse. Id. at 217.
66. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326 (West Supp. 1995). The guardian
ad litem cannot be the attorney responsible for presenting evidence of abuse. Id.
67. See In re Malinda S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Cal. 1990) (finding a social
worker's "objectivity and expertise" suggest that the findings are reliable, because
they prepare such reports "in the regular course of their professional duties").
68. See Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal
System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 500·01 (1989), where the author
notes that juvenile authorities investigating abuse may lack adequate time and
funding to fully investigate allegations. Apel cites MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5·
706 (1984) (requiring a completed investigation within 10 days) and IND. CODE
ANN. § 31·6·11-5 (Burns 1987) (requiring a written report within 48 hours). Id. at
500-01 n.38. Proof frequently involves the child as the only witness to abuse and
no resources are available for expert testimony. Id. at 501. These inherent problems, along with high caseloads caused by reporting requirements, persuade many
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er does not confirm allegations of abuse, the court is unlikely
to substitute its judgment for that of the social worker and
may thus limit further investigation. 69 Because social workers
must respond on an expedited basis with inadequate resources,
the reliance on their investigation is often misplaced.

2.

Parental Interests

Many cases of child abuse are not adequately investigated
due to concern for the rights of parents. Parents traditionally
have several important interests, including keeping their family affairs private,70 maintaining family integrity,71 and minimizing the acrimony of the divorce process. 72 Thus, in custody
cases, parents are generally assumed to be fit, and they have
"comprehensive" legal rights. 73
Courts are generally willing to allow a temporary restricprosecutors not to prosecute child abuse cases. Id.
69. See Myra Sun & Elizabeth Thomas, Custody Litigation on Behalf of Bat·
tered Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 562, 573 (1987) (stating that according to
one estimate, judges follow the recommendations of social workers approximately
90% of the time); see also In re Danielle W., 255 Cal. Rptr. 344, 350 (Ct. App.
1989) (finding that courts can grant limited discretion to Children Services to
determine visitation).
70. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981) (finding general acceptance of the idea that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest). But see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Mar·
ket: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 lIARv. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (1983)
(stating that "the assertion that family affairs should be private has been made by
men to prevent women and children from using state power to improve the conditions of their lives").
71. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that both
parents and children possess reciprocal rights to preserve family integrity). Parents
have an interest in the "companionship, care, custody and management of . . .
children . . . ." Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972». "[T)he children [have an interest) in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association." Id. (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977».
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Morrison, 573 P.2d 41, 49 (Cal. 1978) (finding
that the California Legislature created no fault divorce in order to reduce the
acrimony which divorce proceedings engender).
73. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VAND. L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1984) (finding parental rights include custody of the child, discipline of the child, and decisions about education, medical
treatment, and religious upbringing of the child). Parents may speak for the child
and may assert or waive the child's rights. Id. at 884.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/3

14

Peterson: Minors' Right to Counsel

1995]

MINORS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL

527

tion of parental rights where there is evidence that the child's
safety may be threatened. For example, in emergency situations, most courts will grant temporary custody to one parent
or restrict visitation through a civil protection order. 74 In a
final custody determination, however, restriction of parental
custody to protect the child from harm may require a "fair
preponderance of the evidence. "75 Although the court has
broad power to protect the child's interests,76 lack of evidence
of abuse may prevent the court from restricting custody.77
Thus, this concern for the rights of parents effectively
diminishes concern for the best interests of the child.
IV. THE MODERN TREND IN STATE COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES: MANDATORY APPOINTMENT

Because appointment of counsel for the child is discretionary in most states, failure to appoint is rarely reviewed by appellate courtS. 78 However, some state appellate courts have
found an abuse of discretion in failing to appoint where there
were allegations of child abuse. 79 In G.S. v. T.S.,80 a Connect-

74. Most states allow a parent to obtain temporary custody of her children
through a civil protection order obtained ex parte. Peter Finn, Statutory Authority
in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23
FAM. L.Q. 43, 51 (1989). Ex parte orders for emergency situations are typically
valid for ten to fourteen days. Id.; Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96
(Okla. App. 1984) (allowing a temporary restriction on visitation). Before issuing
such an order, California courts must consider whether the best interests of the
child require suspended or denied visitation. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100(b)' (West
Supp. 1995).
75. See, e.g., Mallory v. Mallory, 539 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1988) (requiring a
fair preponderance of the evidence to restrict custody).
76. See In re Macomber, 461 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Mich. 1990) (finding that the
legislature has given the court broad authority to define harmful conduct and
fashion remedies as "necessary for the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a
particular child"); In re Albert B., 263 Cal. Rptr. 694, 702 (Ct. App. 1989) (balancing the rights of parents and children in a dependency proceeding for neglect).
The court found that children have a right to custody that does not constantly
endanger them. Id.
77. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
78. See Elrod, supra note 22, at 56.
79. See M.M. v. R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 1984), where the
appellate court held that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad
litem where the parents strongly disputed custody and the stepfather abused the
children. Lack of independent representation resulted in minimal testimony by the
children and an incomplete record. Id.; Leonard v. Leonard, 783 S.W.2d 514, 516
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian
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icut trial court failed to appoint counsel for the minor children
despite a motion for appointment by one parent and knowledge
that child abuse would be a major issue in the custody proceeding. sl Finding that evidence was not conclusive concerning the
custodial parent's knowledge of abuse by a cousin, the trial
court maintained custody with that parent. S2 The appellate
court remanded, however, noting that the presence of counsel
for the children would likely have led to several changes in the
trial proceedings. 83 The appellate court concluded that, in contested custody proceedings containing allegations of child
abuse, neither the parents nor the court can be relied upon to
advocate the children's best interests. 84 Therefore, the children both "[need] and [are] entitled to counsel to advocate their
best interests. 1185
Similarly, in C.J.(SJ.R. v. a.D.S.,ss a Missouri trial court
found that "the child abuse was not a sufficient change in
conditions to merit a change in [the children's] custody."s7 The
appellate court reversed, stating that the child's interests typically are not represented in custody cases involving child abuse
because "the evidence gatherers are the lawyers for the competing parents, whose primary purpose is to put their client's
best foot forward." ss The court held it was an abuse of discre-

ad litem where the court had knowledge of alleged abuse by a parent claiming a
right to custody).
80. 582 A.2d 467, 470 (Conn. App. 1990) (finding that in contested custody
cases where there are allegations of abuse, "children have a unique need to be
represented by counsel who will advocate their best interests").
81. [d. at 468. Before the trial started, the court changed temporary custody
based upon allegations that the custodial parent's cousin. had sexually molested
one of the children. [d. On the first day of trial, the cousin admitted the molestation. [d. at 469. The custodial parent denied knowledge of the abuse despite conflicting testimony. [d. at 468.
82. [d. at 469.
83. [d. at 470-71. The court of appeal noted that counsel for the child could
have requested a family relations study and involved the court in assessing the
allegations at the earliest possible date. [d. at 470. Counsel could have pointed out
that the child was competent to testify and argued that the child's testimony was
pivotal. [d. Counsel could also have contested the parent's waiver of the child's
confidentiality with her sexual abuse counselor. [d. at 471.
84. [d. at 471.
85. o.S., 582 A.2d at 471.
86. 701 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. App. 1985).
87. [d. at 168-69.
88. 1d. at 169.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/3

16

Peterson: Minors' Right to Counsel

1995]

MINORS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL

529

tion not to appoint a guardian ad litem where the trial court in
a custody dispute knows of past or current child abuse. 89 Acknowledging the court's holding, in 1988 the Missouri Legislature passed a statute mandating appointment of a representative for the child where there are allegations of child abuse or
neglect. 90
Other courts, however, have not been so willing to find an
abuse of discretion in the failure to appoint a representative
for the child. 9! In Sucher v. Sucher,92 the Minnesota Court of
Appeal refused to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem though each parent had
alleged abuse' and had requested appointment. 93 The trial
court found that the mother's friends had either sexually
"abused the children or behaved in a less than exemplary manner ...w. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to confirm that the mother had allowed sexual
abuse of the children or that the father had physically abused
the mother or coached the children to allege abuse. 95
The dissent in Sucher argued that the children's safety
required an independent representative for the children's interests. 96 Following that logic, the Minnesota Legislature amend-

89. [d. The court urged the legislature to codify the decision. [d.
90. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.423.1 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that "[tlhe

court shall appoint a guardian ad litem in any proceeding in which child abuse or
neglect is alleged"); see also Leonard v. Leonard, 783 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo. App.
1990) (finding that C.J.(S).R u. G.D.S. took away judicial discretion in appointment
"where custody is an issue and the court has knowledge of alleged abuse by one
claiming a right to custody").
91. See Schenk v. Schenk, 564 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
no abuse of discretion in not appointing a guardian ad litem in modification proceeding where the trial court removed. custody from the mother who was currently
involved with the past abuser of the children). In Schenk, although the trial court
did not appoint counsel, it did, however, remove the children from a potentially
abusive situation. [d. at 975.
92. 416 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
93. [d. at 186.
94. [d. at 184.
95. See id. at 183-84. The prevalence of child abuse when there is spousal
abuse is discussed supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
96. [d. at 186 (Lansing, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the threat to
the children's safety required "vigorous independent representation of the children
by counsel acting in their interest and their interest only." [d. (quoting M.M. v.
R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), where the appellate court con-
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ed the pertinent state statute to require appointment when the
court has reason to believe that a child may be a victim of
abuse. 97
When the trial court knows of allegations of abuse and yet
refuses to appoint an independent representative for the child,
the court denies the child a voice in a proceeding that endangers the child's well-being. 98 Although four states recognize
this danger and have concluded that the child requires independent representation when there are allegations of child
abuse,99 every state should acknowledge this need for counsel
as a due process right. 100

V. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES REQUIRE MANDATORY
APPOINTMENT
Due process guarantees are implicated when government
procedures threaten a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.101 These "liberty interests"
are not limited to protection from government confinement, but
also include involvement in government proceedings which
demned the trial record a8 "woefully incomplete" because there was a past history
of abuse, yet the trial court had not ordered a home study because the parents
believed it unnecessary).
97. See 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 469, § 1. The statute requires the appointment of
a guardian ad litem in any child custody proceeding in which "the court has rea·
son to believe that the minor child is a victim of domestic child abuse or neglect."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.165(2) (West 1990).
98. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (finding that the child's "well·
being" cannot be left. to discretion of estranged parents); see also Short v. Short,
730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) (stating that children may be pawns
between parents and, therefore, require independent representation); Higgins v.
Higgins, 629 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tenn. App. 1981) (stating that in cases of intense
hostility, the rights of children are not properly represented without independent
counsel); Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 1984) (remanding for
appointment to assure that "one voice" represents the child); GoLDSTEIN, ET AL.
supra note 24. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Pro·
ceedings: The Determination of Decision·Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 293
(1983) (concluding that parents cannot be expected to represent the child's best
interests when their interests conflict with those of the child).
99. Connecticut requires appointment by judicial precedent. Missouri, Minneso·
ta, and Florida require appointment by statute. Wisconsin requires appointment in
all contested cases. See supra notes 18-19 discussing the state statutes.
100. See infra notes 101-50 and accompanying text.
101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .").
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affect safety and well-being. 102 Furthermore, the United
States Constitution generally affords children rights coextensive with those of adults when the government seeks to deprive children of these interests. 103
The circumstances implicating due process depend upon
the nature of the government function and the private interest
affected by the government action. 104 In extending due process rights to civil divorce proceedings, the United States Supreme Court stressed the exclusiveness of the judicial remedy
and the fundamental nature of the subject matter. 105 Additionally, judges generally recognize parental loss of custody as
"punishment more severe than many criminal sanctions."106
The policy behind extension of due process rights to civil
divorce proceedings is equally persuasive when viewed from

102. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). Liberty has a
broad meaning extending to rights "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness . . . . " Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923»; Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (finding school children have a liberty interest
in personal security).
103. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979).
104. See In the matter of K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278 (Alaska 1991) (holding an
indigent father has a due process right to counsel in termination proceedings). The
court noted that parental rights are of the highest significance when faced with
the finality of termination. Id. at 283. But see Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (noting that notice and hearing are
not constitutionally required when the private interest is a privilege granted by
the government).
105. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971). The Court held that due
process prohibits denying an indigent access to divorce courts because the requirement of a judicial decree for divorce is "entirely a state-created matter." Id. The
Court stated that the right of access to divorce courts is "the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id.; see Flores v.
Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979), where the court found that there is a
strong state interest in divorce-child custody proceedings. Unlike commercial contracts, legally binding marriages and divorces are wholly creations of the state."
Id.
106. Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in froceeding
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141, 1145; cf May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (noting that custody is far more important
than property rights); see also Order-Probable Jurisdiction Noted or Postponed,
402 U.S. 954, 954-61 (1971), where Justices Black and Douglas comment that the
due process found in Boddie should apply to all civil disputes. Justice Black noted
that when due process guarantees "meaningful access to civil courts in divorce
cases, ... Boddie necessitates the appointment of counsel for indigents." Id. at
959.
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the child's perspective. 107 Although children are legally considered "persons, »108 courts limit their constitutional rights
because of their immaturity and in deference to the role of parents in overseeing children. 109 Normally, parents assume control of the child. However, when parental control fails, the
government adopts the role of parens patriae. l1O When both
the parents and the government fail to protect a minor's rights,
due process must provide the child with constitutional guarantees.l11 Divorce custody decisions are exemplary of a situation
where the child's rights may lack protection because both the
government and the parents have other interests that overshadow the interests of the child. 112

A.

THE SUPREME COURT'S BALANCING TEST

The United States Supreme Court has adopted a balancing
test to determine what process is due. 113 The Court looks at
three distinct factors: the private interest affected by the offi-

107. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (holding a lack of due process exists where procedures do not protect the interests of those bound but not
present). In states with discretionary appointment a child is usually not present or
independently represented. See supra notes 3 & 9 and accompanying text.
108. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (stating that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of mlYority"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 13 (1967) (stating that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone").
109. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (invalidating a Massachusetts law requiring parental consent for abortions by unmarried minors). The
Court summarized the rationale for treating children differently than adults,
stressing "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child-rearing." Id.
110. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (allowing pretrial preventive
detention for juvenile suspects). Parens patriae originally referred to the state's
protection of the property and person of the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
111. Cf, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28 (establishing a minor's constitutional
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings which may result in commitment to an institution); see Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in CUBtody Decisions: All that Glitters is not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27, 27 (1976-77) (finding that Gault changed "the balance of power in child-populated, adult-dominated
institutions").
112. Bersoff, supra note Ill, at 30-33. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying
text for the author's discussion regarding how the states' and parents' interests
often overshadow the interests of the child.
113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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cial action, the risk of error in the state's chosen procedure and
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the
state's interest in maintaining the current procedure. 114
1.

The Child's Interests

The child has a strong interest in growing up free from
abuse. 116 "[C]hlldren who are abused in their youth generally
face extraordinary problems developing into responsible, productive citizens."I1S An abused child has an increased likelihood of later winding up in juvenile court and, finally, in adult
criminal proceedings. ll7 Thus, by appointing counsel to ensure representation of the child's best interests, the court can
fully explore the possibility that the child is being abused.
Moreover, by removing the child from an abusive situation, the
court promotes the child's growth into a responsible adult.

2.

The Risk of Error in Current Procedures and the Probable
Value of Additional Safeguards

Contested custody determinations are by their nature
exceedingly difficult decisions for a court, requiring a prediction of the future welfare of the child based upon limited information. 118 When allegations of child abuse exist, the complexity of these proceedings is enhanced,119 thereby increasing the
danger that a court might ratify an ongoing relationship with a
potentially abusive parent. 120 Evidence in custody proceed-

114. See icl. The state's interests include the government function involved and
"fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail." [d.
115. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (observing that the
entire society benefits when the child is "safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth").
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.s. 745, 789 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Podell, supra note 8, at 106 (observing that the public will pay more in
future costs if the child's welfare is not properly considered at the divorce custody
proceeding).
118. See supra note 4.
119. Nancy Thoennes, Child Sexual Abuse: Whom Should a Judge Believe? What
Should a Judge Believe?, THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Summer 1988, Vol. 27, No.3, 14,
·17 (1988) (observing that contested custody proceedings with allegations of abuse
are the most complex and time-consuming proceedings in family court).
120. See GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 24, at 66. The authors state that "the
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ings is often entered in the form of opinion not subject to crossexamination. 121 Moreover, the frequent lack of outside witnesses or any physical evidence can make the child's statement
concerning abuse the key factor supporting allegations. 122
However, one parent typically challenges the veracity or relevance of the child's statement. 123 Furthermore, there may be
repetitive and improper physical or psychological examination
of the child which can violate the child's best interests and
produce questionable results as well. 124 Finally, the court
presumption [of parental representation of the child) should not prevail . . . once
the child's placement becomes the subject of a dispute" in the courts and that the
state's "policies or practices" may also be adverse to the child. Id. In these cases,
the child should be accorded party status and given independent representation.
Id.; see also Inker & Perretta, supra note 8, at 111 (suggesting that independent
evidence, rather than partisan parental advocacy, would better determine the
child's best interests); Podell, supra note 8, at 103 (arguing that the child of divorce is often a "disenfranchised victim used as a pawn in a game of chess being
played between its warring parents who frequently want the court to physically
cut up and divide the child between them in the same manner that they have
[done) emotionally"); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), where, in the criminal
area, the court found that the state's paternalistic dogma of state protection under
the doctrine of parens patriae can be an "invitation to procedural arbitrariness"
that violates due process for the child and requires independent representation.
When the court reaches results of "tremendous consequence, [it) must measure up
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id.
121. See Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 41 (Md. App. 1993), where the court
noted that "child custody reports often contain double- or triple-level hearsay, as
well as opinions of various social workers, medical or paramedical personnel, psychologists, teachers and the like, which mayor may not have a reasonable basis."
Id. "Generally, these reports are not under oath and often emanate from people
having an overt or covert bias." Id.
122. See State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985), where the court observed that witnesses other than the child are rare, as molestation is usually done
in private. Since the physical evidence may be inconclusive, proof of abuse depends
.
upon the child's statements. Id.
123. Apel, supra note 68, at 496 (explaining that children are often accused of
fabricating abuse); HOROWITZ, supra note 30, at 60 (concluding that the pressures
on the child can lead to either false denial or false affirmation of the allegations);
Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 463 (1989) (concluding that psychologists lack a profile to separate abuse from other traumatic experiences such
as divorce); see generally John R. Christiansen, The Testimony pn Child Witnesses:
Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705
(1987) (summarizing problems associated with determining the child's competency
and credibility).
124. See Gotwald v. Gotwald, 768 S.W.2d 689, 701 (Tenn. App. 1988) (Franks,
J., concurring) (recommending that the court protect the child from repetitive evaluations and physical examinations by "hired guns"); Roland C. Summit, The Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177 (1983),
where the authors find that repeated questioning of an abused child about a trau-
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may apply current fads in social research pertaining to custody125 or .overly rely upon reports from social welfare agencies
which may minimize the consideration of abuse. 126 Because
the risk of an erroneous custody determination increases when
allegations of abuse exist, the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards is magnified.
Numerous courts have acknowledged a need for independent counsel for the child in sharply contested custody disputes
to ensure that the presentation of evidence remains clearly
focused on the best interests of the child. 127 Appointment of
counsel helps guarantee that the possibility of child abuse will
be fully explored. 128 Additionally, appointment of counsel can
guarantee the child a continuing relationship if there are multiple proceedings or if new facts concerning abuse come to
light.129 Thus, if states were required to appoint counsel for
matic event will double the trauma. Unless the child is strongly supported, the
child normally retracts her complaint of abuse. Id. at 188.
125. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in
Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, WIS. L. REV. 107, 118-19
(1987). The authors analyze the use and misuse of social science research in custo·
dy decisions and argue that current emphasis on "father custody" literature has
seriously eroded the mother's position in custody decisions to the detriment of the
child's best interests. Id. But see David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assess·
ing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J.
1005 (1989) (defending the usefulness of social science data which is free from the
bias of the individual researcher).
126. See Apel, supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inherent problems of investigating allegations of child abuse.
127. See, e.g., Yontef v. Yontef, 440 A.2d 899, 904 (Conn. 1981) (stating that
the court should appoint independent counsel in seriously contested cases); see also
Gennarini v. Gennarini, 477 A.2d 674, 675 n.3 (Conn. App. 1984) (stating that the
trial court should appoint an attorney for the child in a bitterly contested visita·
tion dispute); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439, 444-45 (Mont. 1978) (find·
ing that the trial court erred in failing to allow counsel for the children to partici·
pate in all hearings); de Montigny v. de Montigny, 233 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Wis.
1975) (finding an abuse of discretion in failure to appoint counsel).
128. Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role,
21 J. FAM. L. 607, 629 (1982-83) (finding that as the proceeding becomes more
complex, the child has greater need for an independent advocate to protect her
interests and to bring out all relevant facts); see Martin Guggenheim, The Right to
be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 121-22 (arguing that because the best interests test makes
virtually all aspects of a parent's life relevant, a child advocate may probe into
"deeply held secrets" which parents have privately agreed to keep out of the
court's view); supra notes 20-77 and accompanying text emphasizing that concern
for parental rights often conceals child abuse.
129. Esdale v. Esdale, 487 So. 2d 1219, 1219 (Fla. App. 1986) (stating that
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the child in all custody disputes involving allegations of abuse,
the child's attorney could act as an independent advocate to
ensure a full investigation, to protect the child's rights, and to
develop a full record for judicial review.

3.

The Government's Interest in Maintaining Procedural
Status Quo

In evaluating whether due process principles require mandatory appointment of counsel, the child's interests and the
gravity of an erroneous determination must be balanced
against the interest of the state in maintaining its current
procedure. 130 In divorce custody proceedings, although the
state shares some of the child's interests, other state interests
are divergent.
The state's foremost interest is to ensure the best interests
of the child. 13l Because the custody proceeding defines the
limits of the child's relationship with a parent, the state must
assume certain affirmative duties to protect that child's interests.132 Nevertheless, other state interests conflict with the
interests of the child and thereby favor the state's maintenance
of the current discretionary appointment procedure. These
state interests include minimal interference in family relations,133 supporting confidence in social services' determina-

appointment of guardian ad litem for six months where abuse was not confirmed
allows the child's interests to be monitored}.
130. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's balancing test.
131. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (observing that "probably every
State in the Union ... requires the court to put the child's interest first"); supra
note 2 for substantiation of the difficulty of determining that interest; cf. Lassiter
v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1980) (finding a shared interest
between the state and the parept in a just and accurate decision in a termination
proceeding).
132. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
200 (1989) (observing that "[t)he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the
State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent
to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalF).
133. See supra note 61. But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944), where the court notes that the state may interfere in family affairs to
safeguard the child's health, educational development and emotional well-being. Id.
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tion of abuse,134 and saving the· cost of appointment where
the parents are indigent. 135
Because the "best interests of the child" is the commanding purpose of custody proceedings/3s and because these interests are not advanced when courts have discretion whether
to appoint independent counsel for the child,137 other state
interests that conflict with the interests of the child should be
accorded less importance. When the state's interest in assuring that children are adequately represented is compared with
conflicting state interests that favor maintenance of discretionary appointment, these latter interests appear insignificant.
B.

THE BALANCING TEST FAVORS MANDATORY APPOINTMENT

Although courts are hesitant to presume a due process
right to state appointed counsel in a particular class of cases,
when the party's "interests [are] at their strongest, the States'
interests [are] at their weakest, and the risks of error [are] at
their peak," the presumption against the appointment of counsel can be overcome. 138 In child custody proceedings involving
allegations of abuse, the child's interest in representation is
strong,139 the risk of error without an independent representative for the child is substantial,140 and the countervailing
state interest in maintaining discretionary appointment is
negligible. 141 Because current procedures do not promote the
commanding purpose of custody determinations, the best interests of the child, the state's interest in avoiding appointment is
not sufficient to outweigh the child's interest in adequate representation. 142
134. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 23-77 and accompanying text.
138. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
139. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 23-77 and 119·30 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
142. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (finding
that the state's pecuniary interest is not sufficient to overcome a parent's interest
in appointed counsel in a termination proceeding). In its brief the State admitted
that the potential costs of appointed counsel in termination proceedings are admittedly de minimis compared to the costs in all criminal actions. See id.
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In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,143 the Supreme Court found that the United States Constitution allows
a case-by-case determination of the parental right to appointed
counsel in termination proceedings rather than guaranteeing
that right in every case. 144 The Court admitted that informed
public opinion recommends, and most state statutes provide,
appointed counsel in termination proceedings. 145 The Court
noted, however, that the decision whether to require mandatory appointment is left to the states. 146

Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued that a bright-line
rule guaranteeing appointment is necessary to provide due
process to parents. 147 He stressed that a bright-line approach
provides "procedural norms" in error-prone areas 148 and simplifies appellate review. 149
Lassiter involved proceedings where the parent was present and had a right to be represented by retained counsel. In
divorce custody proceedings where there are allegations of
child abuse, the fact that the child lacks both party status and
a right to retained counsel greatly increases the likelihood that

143. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (leaving the determination to the trial court with appellate review). But see In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 286 (Alaska 1991) (holding that
termination proceedings require court appointed counsel for the indigent parent).
The court in K.L.J. cited Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3d
1141, 1144-45 as support for the proposition that courts generally find that loss of
child custody or permanent termination requires procedural due process. Id. at
285.
144. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
145. Id. at 33-34. The Court stated that "Iilnformed opinion has clearly come to
hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not
only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well." The Court noted that 33 states and the District of Columbia provide
for the appointment of counsel in termination cases by statute. Id. at 34.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 50 (arguing that when the generality of cases is subject to error,
procedural norms should be devised to provide justice); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. at 18 (noting that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure").
149. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51. Justice Blackmun stated that a case-by-case
approach does not lend itself practically to judicial review, because the transcript
will not be dispositive of whether an unrepresented indigent was disadvantaged.
[d. Consequently, the reviewing court must expand its analysis into a "cumbersome and costly," time-consuming investigation of the entire proceeding. Id. at 51.
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the child's interests will not be adequately protected because
the child must depend upon the other parties to represent his
or her interests. 15o Under these conditions, an even stronger
basis supports Justice Blackmun's assertion that discretionary
appointment violates due process principles and that a brightline rule for appointment is critical. 151

VI. COMPARING CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS TO
DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
Dependency and termination proceedings parallel "a child
custody controversy between parents, except that the controversy is not between parents but one, between a parent ...
and the state as parens patriae."152 State laws generally require that a guardian ad litem or counsel be appointed for the
child in state proceedings resulting from a report of abuse or
neglect. 153 About half the states statutorily require that an
attorney represent the child. 154 Moreover, while the representation of allegedly abused children in these state-initiated proceedings is governed by state statutes, it is frequently argued·
that due process principles impose a duty upon the states to
150. See supra notes 3 & 9.
151. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that the
complexity of the proceedings and the inability of the parent to present her own
case could require due process appointment).
152. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1982). In Santosky, the Court
noted that a dependency proceeding permits the state to remove a child temporarily from his home to the care of an authorized agency if the child appears "neglected." Id. at 748. The state has an obligation to attempt to reunite the family. Id.
However, if the child app~ars "permanently neglected," the state can permanently
terminate all parental rights based upon a presentation of clear and convincing
evidence to this effect in a termination proceeding. Id. at 748-49; see also In re
Robinson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Ct. App. 1970).
153. In order for states to receive funding under the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5101, they must provide by statute that "in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a
judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child
in such proceedings." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(d)(7) (1985). The American Bar Association adopted a policy in 1989 stating that, in child abuse and neglect-related judicial proceeding, all children should be represented by both a lay guardian ad litem
and an attorney acting as the child's legal counsel. Davidson, supra note 8, at
262.
154. Davidson, supra note 8, at 268-69. Other states provide a lay or government representative for the child, instead of an attorney, and thereby qualify for
federal funding under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-07 (1988). See id.
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provide representation. 155
Just as in divorce custody cases, dependency and termination proceedings involve potential conflicts between the parent
and the child as well as the state and the child. 156 Contrary
to divorce custody proceedings, however, in termination and
dependency proceedings the importance of independent representation for the child is universally recognized. 157 In dependency proceedings courts have required appointment of counsel
for the child once the government alleges that a home is unfit.158 Without independent representation, "plea" bargaining
or an agreement between parents and the government may

155. See James R. Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Coun·
sel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REV.
521, 530 (1978) (arguing that independent counsel for the child should be required
in any proceeding which may affect the child's custody or quality of life); see also
Inker & Perretta, supra note 8, at 116·19 (maintaining that fair treatment reo
quires a right to counsel when government action may seriously injure an individ·
ual).
156. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 757
(Or. App. 1974) (requiring independent counsel for the child because the parent
and government do not provide effective representation).
157. See supra note 152.
158. In re Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201·02 (Ct.App. 1986). Counsel contino
ues until relieved by the court. Id. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp.
1995) provides in relevant part:
The counsel for the minor shall be charged in general
with the representation of the minor's interests. To that
end, the counsel shall make . . . further investigations
that he or she deems in good faith to be reasonably nec·
essary to ascertain the facts, including the interviewing of
witnesses, and he or she shall examine and cross·examine
witnesses in both the adjudicatory and dispositional hear·
ings. He or she may also introduce and examine his or
her own witnesses, make recommendations to the court
concerning the child's welfare, and participate further in
the proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately
represent the minor . . . . In addition, counsel shall in·
vestigate the interests of the child beyond the scope of
the juvenile proceeding and report to the court other
interests of the minor that may need to be protected by
the institution of other administrative or judicial proceed·
ings . . . .
Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/3

28

Peterson: Minors' Right to Counsel

MINORS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1995]

541

disadvantage the child's best interests. 159
When abuse is alleged in a private custody dispute, termination or severe restriction of custody and visitation is often
sought. Because the child's need for representation in parental
termination proceedings is well established/60 even if not recognized as a due process right, this interest should extend to
private proceedings which involve the same conflicts and have
the same consequences. The child's interest in a continuing
relationship with a parent is no less important when another
parent, rather than the state, seeks to effectively terminate
that relationship.
VII. CONCLUSION
Juvenile courts, which provide direct representation for
the child, were designed to handle dependency and termination
cases involving parental abuse of children. 161 Unfortunately,
family courts, designed to decide custody between parents, are
increasingly forced to deal with allegations of child abuse. 162
Under these conditions, divorce custody proceedings represent
an important opportunity for the state to protect the child
when dependency or termination hearings are not initiated or
are dismissed for insufficient evidence. 163 Even when the
"best interests of the child" standard explicitly includes a history of child abuse as a factor in determining custody and visitation, "substantial corroboration" may be required. 164 Corrobo159. In re Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr. at 203. In Melissa S., the court found:
When a welfare department's social worker has recommended a minor be made a dependent child and removed
from parental custody, and when a parent has entered
into a "plea" arrangement, conceivably to preclude
adjudication of the more serious acts alleged in the petition, both the welfare department and the parent may
have an interest in letting the allegations of the petition
and the substance of the report pass unchallenged. This
does not, however, assure that the best interestS of the
minor are being served, precisely the reason that independent counsel is statutorily required.

Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra note 152.
Edwards, supra note 65, at 204.
See id.
See id. at 269.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994) (requiring substantial independent
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ration may be lacking, however, because often the child is not
adequately represented and evidence of abuse is not fully explored. Appellate courts must depend upon trial courts to develop a factual record concerning both the allegations of abuse
and the existence of adequate representation for the child.
Consequently, the legislatures and courts of several states
have recognized that allegations of child abuse require mandatory appointment of a representative for the child. 165
Although states may resist adding another participant to
an already complex proceeding, protection of the child's due
process right to a custody decision that ensures his or her
safety requires imposing upon the courts a "bright-line" rule
for appointment of counsel. When allegations of child abuse
cloud a custody proceeding, an initial case-by-case judicial
determination of the adequacy of the child's representation by
others is too problematic. Children's need for independent
representation in dependency and termination proceedings,
where their interests are similarly threatened, is universally
acknowledged. Giving children the equivalent opportunity to
be heard through appointment of counsel in divorce custody
proceedings will accomplish the procedural regularity which
due process principles demand.

David Peterson·

corroboration for consideration of child abuse or spousal abuse in custody decisions).
165. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
states. When the court has reason to appoint counsel for the child, the child's
counsel implicitly has standing to challenge all matters dealing with him or her.
Lapides v. Lapides, 437 A.2d 251, 254 (Md. App. 1981). The court's appointment of
counsel presumes that the parents cannot provide the minor proper representation.
Id.; see also In re Benjamin D., 278 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1991) (considering minor's lack of counsel at a custody hearing a factor in relitigating abuse
.
charges at a protection hearing).
'" Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.
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